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 Operating from 1995 to 1998, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
of South Africa stands as one of the most unusual and hopeful social phenomena in one 
of the most violent periods in history.  It fell to a commission of seventeen diverse 
South African citizens to sift through over three decades of political crimes and human 
rights violations emanating from apartheid, that nation’s regime of political oppression 
and systematic, enforced racism.  Their charge was to listen to the narratives of both the 
victims and the agents of apartheid and, as one commissioner put it, “hold up a mirror 
to reflect the complete picture” of South Africa’s apartheid past.1  By establishing a 
truthful and shared account of the past, it was hoped the nation could begin to bring 
closure to the wounds and social divisions still roiling in apartheid’s wake.  Nothing 
less than the future of the nation was considered to be at stake.  There was a very real 
concern that if the white minority feared for its safety under a black-controlled 
government and if the long-oppressed black population sought revenge for its past 
torment, a new cycle of violence could erupt again along racial fault lines.2
Truth commissions are increasingly applied as an instrument for promoting 
political and social reconciliation following civil strife.  Of special interest to this paper, 
however, is that the South African TRC, a secular, government institution charged with 
an essentially political outcome, came to be characterized by a narrative of forgiveness, 
a narrative that was expressed in Christian symbols, values, and idiom.  In doing so, 
says Rodney L. Petersen of the Boston Theological Institute, the TRC projected 
forgiveness, a quality long absent from public and foreign policy and often consigned 
to personal relations or the church confessional, to the center of the reconciliation 
discourse in South Africa.3      
                                                
1 Boraine, Alex, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 326. 
2 Villa-Vicencio, Charles, “Restorative Justice in Social Context: The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict, 
ed. Nigel Biggar, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), p. 208.  Villa-Vicencio captures 
this fear of all-against-all violence in the remarks of Thabo Mbeki, currently president of the Republic of 
South Africa but a member of the African National Congress helping write a new constitution in 1993 
when he remarked: “Within the ANC [African National Congress] the cry was to ‘catch the bastards and 
hang them’ – but we realized you could not simultaneously prepare for a peaceful transition while saying 
we want to catch and hang people… If we had taken this route I don’t know where the country would be 
today.  Had there been the threat of Nuremburg-style trials over members of the apartheid security 
establishment, we would never have undergone peaceful change.” 
3 Petersen, Rodney L., “A Theology of Forgiveness: Terminology, Rhetoric, & the Dialectic of Interfaith 
Relationships,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, & Conflict Transformation, 
eds., Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., and Rodney L. Petersen, (Philadelphia & London: Templeton Foundation 
Press, 2001), 4-6. 
During the TRC’s hearings for victims of human rights violations, a significant 
number of those testifying extended forgiveness to their former tormentors, typically 
evoking a scriptural or theological formulation of forgiveness.  Commission members, 
especially TRC Chairman Desmond Tutu, then an Anglican archbishop, further framed 
victim testimony within a master narrative in which forgiveness is not only constitutive 
of interpersonal reconciliation but is also the motive force for social and political 
reconciliation.  For some, framing the truth-telling of the TRC within a larger theme of 
forgiveness was too anemic a response for a nation still deeply scarred by apartheid’s 
violence; specifically, it seemed to make no adequate provision for justice.  This paper, 
however, will argue that the quality of forgiveness may offer a more positive, long-
lasting, and robust response to post-conflict reconciliation than the retributive models 
of justice embodied in tribunals and war crimes trials.  As a corollary, it will also assert 
that, in the understanding of Tutu and the TRC, forgiveness did not exclude or dispense 
with repentance and restitution.  Rather, forgiveness was posited as a force that both 
actuates and propels a continuum that leads to reconciliation; along that continuum, 
repentance and redress may occur.   
 
The “Truth” About Truth Commissions 
  
Truth commissions are temporary bodies charged, in the wake of a period of 
severe internal national conflict, with ascertaining and investigating the authenticity of 
human rights violations, typically by eliciting the stories of both victims and 
perpetrators.  Perpetrators are often offered amnesty for their testimony.  The 
proposition is that by ascertaining the truth of what occurred during a contentious 
period in the nation’s life a new and hopefully shared recollection of the past will 
emerge.  This could, in turn, provide the starting point for the healing and the eventual 
transcending of deep social divisions produced by conflict.  Indeed, truth commissions 
are a popular resource in the international peace and conflict arena.  In the twenty-year 
span between 1974 and 1994 fifteen truth commissions were initiated internationally, 
charged with investigating the details behind human rights violations following periods 
of political oppression and violence.4  In the next seven years, however, between 1995 
and 2002, an additional twelve commissions commenced operation.5
 Truth commissions, however, are seldom as cathartic as might be supposed.  They 
rarely culminate in victims successfully purging their memories of emotional trauma and 
perpetrators releasing their burdens through contrition and repentance.  For many past 
commissions, the “fix” was in from the beginning as the commissions themselves were 
the outcome of protracted negotiation between political forces.6  Often, to even establish 
a commission, the former political power structure extracted a general amnesty for its 
leadership.  Too often truth commissions have been a tool for governments to assure the 
international community that some level of justice has been attained and, in turn, confer 
legitimacy on the new power structure.  In the majority of cases, truth commissions have 
                                                
4  Hayner, Priscilla, “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov.1994), 601-603. 
5 Braham, Eric, “Truth Commissions,” Beyond Intractability, Eds., Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, 
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder.  Posted June 30, 2004 and accessed at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/truth_commissions/. 
6  Ibid. 
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been conducted with little or no transparency.  Since each of the twenty-seven 
commissions established between 1974 and 2002 was engineered around unique 
circumstances, it is difficult to categorize their outcome.  The chief benefit of truth 
commissions is that they provide a prescription for ending violence while also 
sidestepping the difficulties in tribunals and trials.  If, as in a number of cases, the 
commission reports were either rejected by the government, or its contents edited or not 
made available to the public in totality, then some feel they have been victimized a 
second time.  Truth commissions, it seems, seldom produce “truth” in absolute terms. 
 The TRC of South Africa was established after the official end of apartheid 
(literally “apartness” in Afrikaans and Dutch), a compulsory system of racial segregation 
that was officially the law of the land from 1948 to 1994 but which, less officially and 
less starkly, had been the practice within this nation from its earliest roots in British 
Colonialism in the nineteenth century.  Under apartheid, people were classified, by law, 
into a variety of racial groups: whites, blacks, and those of mixed racial origin.  Blacks, in 
particular, were forcibly relocated into “homelands,” the euphemistic label for what was 
similar to a “reservation” of the type created in the United States for Native Americans.  
Blacks could vote only on matters within these “homeland” governments, not in national 
elections.  Education, medical care, and other public services were said to be “separate 
but equal,” but those available to whites were generally considered far superior.  Blacks 
and non-whites could work in white areas as long as each carried special identity cards 
and returned at night to their designated areas.  Whites, while comprising only thirteen 
percent of the total population accounted for sixty-five percent of total personal income.7  
“The apartheid system,” writes Audrey Chapman, “enabled a white minority amounting 
to some thirteen percent of the population to monopolize economic and political power 
and relegate the black majority to a subordinated and politically powerless status.”8   
 After decades of escalating international pressure, the new South African 
government headed by F.W. de Klerk announced its intention in 1989 to end apartheid 
and enter into negotiations with the African National Congress, the leading black 
opposition party in 1990.  It aimed to draft a new constitution based on the principle of 
“one person, one vote.”  In April 1994, following the nation’s first universal suffrage 
elections, Nelson Mandela, head of the African National Congress, was elected President 
of South Africa.9
 The authority for the TRC was provided by the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995, and the new body based its operations in Cape Town, 
South Africa.  The TRC was a court-like body assembled to hear both people who 
claimed to have been victims of “gross human rights violations” as well as perpetrators of 
these violations for whom testimony also provided an opportunity for amnesty from 
prosecution.  The hearings made international news and some entire sessions were 
broadcast on South African television.  The TRC’s work was conducted through three 
committees: one aimed at investigating human rights abuses from 1960 to 1994, a second 
charged with formulating proposals to assist victims with reparations and rehabilitation, 
                                                
7  Sisk, Timothy D., Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 7-16. 
8  Chapman, Audrey and Spong, Bernard, eds., Religion and Reconciliation in South Africa, (Philadelphia 
and London: Templeton Foundation Press, 2003), 3-6. 
9  Sisk, 293. 
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and a third which considered applications for amnesty.  Critical to earning amnesty was 
the condition that crimes had to be shown to be politically, not criminally, motivated and 
the whole truth about the violation was to be told by the person seeking amnesty.10  In the 
end, the amnesty committee was completely overwhelmed with over 7,000 applications 
for amnesty of which perhaps over 65% were from people already in custody or whose 
crimes were considered ordinary criminal violations, not politically motivated.  Coping 
with this sheer volume as well as internal disputes of what constituted political 
motivation, kept the number of actual amnesty grants to less than 1,000.11   
On October 28, 1998, the Commission presented its final report.  While there was 
considerable divergence in opinion in those early days as to the value of the TRC along 
racial lines, most South Africans, by the close of the Commission’s work in 1998, had 
judged the Commission worthwhile.  Fifty-seven percent of South Africans rated the 
TRC either a “very good thing” or a “good thing” for the country.12  Measured along 
racial cleavages, however, seventy-two percent of African respondents were positive 
about the  
TRC compared to just fifteen percent of whites.13  As time moves on, however, there is a 
growing convergence in views.  In more recent data, published in 2006, the work of the 
TRC seems to have contributed to a growing perception, even among whites, that 
apartheid was indeed a “crime against humanity.”  A strong majority of 87.7% of South 
Africans concurs with that statement, while 76.3% of whites agree.14     
 
Mandela and Tutu, the TRC’s Secular and Sacred Faces 
 
 A substantial portion of whatever success is credited to South Africa’s TRC can 
be traced to South Africa’s two iconic figures of apartheid resistance: Nelson Mandela, 
the long-imprisoned secular saint of South Africa’s struggle against apartheid, and 
Desmond Tutu, the Anglican archbishop of Cape Town and winner of the Nobel Peace 
Prize of 1984.  Both men rose to worldwide fame in the 1980s as opponents of apartheid.  
Mandela was elected president of South Africa in 1994 in the first fully-representative 
elections in that nation’s history, thus becoming the nation’s first black president.  Tutu 
headed the TRC from 1995 to 1998 and was generally credited with originating the term 
“Rainbow Nation” as a metaphor to describe his vision of a post-apartheid South Africa.    
                                                
10  According to the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, a crime was considered 
“political” when committed by a member of a “publicly known political organization or liberation 
movement” or by an employee of the state either acting “in furtherance of a political struggle or with the 
object of countering or otherwise resisting said struggle.”  Further, to fit into this political crime template, it 
had to have been committed “in the course and scope of his or her duties and within the scope of his or her 
express or implied authority.”  Another consideration was whether the crime was proportionate to the threat 
posed by the victim.  
11 Graybill, Lyn S., Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?, (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002), 62-67. 
12 Theissen, Gunnar, “Object of Trust and Hatred: Public Attitudes Towards the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission”, chapter within Truth and Reconciliation: Has the TRC Delivered eds., Audrey Chapman and 
Hugo van der Merwe, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, to be published 2007), 45.     
13 Ibid.      
14 Hofmeyr, J.H., “Report of the Sixth Round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey,” (Wynberg: 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2006), 67. 
 4
 While equally committed to a peaceful resistance to oppression, Mandela and 
Tutu differed considerably in religious perspective.  In her book, Truth & Reconciliation 
in South Africa, Lyn Graybill calls Nelson Mandela the “pragmatic reconciler” whose 
very life has been an example of suffering and perseverance in pursuit of black liberation.  
Mandela, she adds, saw his mission as “one of preaching reconciliation, of binding the 
wounds of the country, of engendering trust and confidence.”  Mandela’s extraordinary 
efforts at political forgiveness (he invited, for example, the prosecutor who sought the 
death penalty for him to lunch following his election to president in 1994) and 
reconciliation was applauded worldwide.  According to Graybill, however, analysts 
sought, in vain, for some personality trait or secret that would explain this extraordinary 
commitment to peace and reconciliation.  While many expect to find its locus in religious 
conviction, Mandela claims that he is “not particularly religious or spiritual,” although he 
says he admires what the faith communities did to oppose apartheid.  Recognizing their 
role, he states: “When others inside the country were gagged and could not speak and 
could not travel and others were thrown in jail, it was the Church that kept the fire 
burning and kept the ideas for which they were suffering alive.”15   
 While there is no question that Mandela’s astonishing generosity of spirit was a 
driving factor behind the country’s efforts at reconciliation and amnesty for human rights 
offenders, it must also be acknowledged that in South Africa, truth commissions offering 
some level of amnesty are often the only route available to new, and often weak, 
democracies.  Helen Cobban, global affairs columnist for the Christian Science Monitor, 
writes that South Africa’s powerful military and security bosses had already told Mandela 
and the ANC that they would not provide security for the crucial elections of 1994 unless 
some credible form of amnesty from prosecution was proffered.16  So, again, in South 
Africa as in so many other truth commission venues, amnesty-for-truth-telling became 
the pragmatic partner of the TRC’s work of restoration and reconciliation. 
 The engine that drove Nelson Mandela, says Graybill, was not religion but rather 
the strength of his commitment to a non-racial democracy.  “The key,” according to 
Graybill, “is that Mandela never doubted that one day he would be a free man and 
eventually president.  He simply did not have the luxury of succumbing to hate and 
revenge.  Overcoming white fears of a nonracial democracy was crucial, and earning the 
trust and confidence of whites made the political settlement possible.”17  It was by sheer 
personal example and commitment that Mandela was able to show a new path forward 
grounded by reconciliation rather than retribution.  This simple but profound act of 
human will moved Robin Petersen, senior lecturer in Christian studies at the University 
of the Western Cape, to anoint Mandela’s acts as radiating an “almost salvific power.”18
 While Mandela provided the secular “jump-start” to national reconciliation, the 
activity of the TRC, a secular apparatus, was nonetheless strikingly imbued with religious 
language and ritual, qualities that were strategically inserted by Desmond Tutu, the 
TRC’s chair, as well as deputy chair, Alex Boraine, President of the Methodist Church of 
                                                
15 Graybill, 11, 18-19. 
16 Cobban, Helena, “Religion and Violence,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, December 
2005, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1128. 
17 Graybill, 19. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
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Southern Africa.  Consider Tutu’s earliest efforts, in his own words, in bringing his TRC 
team together and bringing their mission into focus. 
 
Despite our diversity, the commissioners agreed to my proposal at the 
first meeting that we should go on a retreat, where we sought to 
enhance our spiritual resources and sharpen our sensitivities.  We sat 
at the feet of a spiritual guru, who happened to be my own spiritual 
counselor, while we kept silence for a day, seeking to open ourselves 
to the movement and guidance of the transcendent Spirit.19
 
It is rare that a description or historical analysis of the TRC does not remark upon 
the religious character of the proceedings.  The first hearing, in particular, stamped the 
process with a religious tone when Tutu opened the meeting with a prayer and 
Commissioner Bongani Finca sang a hymn of African Christian origin, “The Forgiveness 
of Sins Makes a Person Whole.”  Throughout the TRC process, observes Graybill in her 
account of the hearings, Tutu clearly operated as a religious figure during the 
proceedings, wearing a purple cassock and reverently lighting candles as if he were 
officiating at a sacred service.  Such demeanor prompted one observer to comment on the 
liturgical character of the hearings.   
 
Each hearing is opened with a prayer – sometimes Christian, 
sometimes Muslim, sometimes Jewish – and a large, white candle 
representing truth is solemnly lit.  The audience is then asked to rise 
out of respect for the victims and their families while they file in… 
The seven commissioners in attendance then came down from their 
white linen-clad tables to welcome the victims – by shaking hands, 
embracing, kissing.  Many of the victims were already sobbing, 
overcome by the mere fact that an official government representative 
was showing them respect.20   
 
Standing on Holy Ground 
 
The very solemnity and liturgical atmosphere of the TRC assemblies may have 
played a role in moving people to extraordinary acts of both repentance and forgiveness.  
Tutu relates one especially tense scene in which members of a militia, accused of a 
particularly brutal massacre of anti-apartheid demonstrators, stood before a packed house 
of victims and relatives of victims.  Tutu describes the situation in the hearing room as 
“combustible” until one of the officers, acting as a spokesman, begged for forgiveness: 
“Please, forgive us.  Please accept my colleagues back into the community.”21  Tutu 
relates what happened next: 
                                                
19 Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness, (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 81. 
20 Gallagher, Susan Van Zanten, “Cry with a Beloved Country: Restoring Dignity to the Victims of 
Apartheid,” Christianity Today, February 9, 1998, 1, at (http://ctilibrary.com)
21 Tutu, Desmond M., “Foreword,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, & Conflict 
Transformation, eds., Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., and Rodney L. Petersen, (Philadelphia & London: 
Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), xii. 
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And do you know what that audience, that angry audience, did?  It 
broke out into deafening applause.  And afterwards I said, “Please let 
us keep quiet because we are in the presence of something holy… 
Really, the only appropriate response is for us to take off our shoes, 
because we are standing on holy ground.22
 
Almost certainly South Africa’s government had never seen one of its secular 
activities so overtaken by religious overtones.  And, indeed, it proved unnerving for 
some.  As a result of the commission’s religious and often lachrymose atmosphere, the 
TRC was derided by some secular critics as the “Kleenex Commission.”23  It earned Tutu 
considerable criticism from critics who often attacked the emphasis not only on 
individual reconciliation but also on what they viewed as an excessively religious 
atmosphere and discourse.  The criticism was not isolated to strictly secular voices; it 
came from religious figures in the TRC as well.  One of the commissioners, Professor 
Piet Meiring, an ordained minister in the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), theologian, 
and university professor in church history, noted the complaints of certain 
Commissioners and staff.   
 
The previous hearing, in East London, as well as numerous TRC 
ceremonies of the previous weeks… were far too ‘religious’ for (the 
Commissioners) taste.  The many prayers, the hymn singing before 
and during the hearings and the religious wrappings of the process 
were out of place.  The TRC process was a legal process and should 
be conducted in a juridical style.24
 
 Indeed Tutu, as an internationally recognized and charismatic personality, was the 
human face of the TRC and, in this role, he often spoke in a religious idiom.  Bishop 
Peter Storey, a retired Methodist bishop and member of the TRC has said of Tutu: “He 
has wept with the victims and marked every moment of repentance and forgiveness with 
awe.  Where a jurist would have been logical, he has not hesitated to be theological.  He 
has sensed when to lead an audience in a hymn to help a victim recover composure, and 
when to call them all to prayer.”25  There can be little question that it was this uniquely 
compassionate and open vulnerability that also drew the attention (and cameras) of the 
world’s media to Cape Town.  While Tutu may not have intended the TRC to be 
theatrical, it often had that shading which, in turn, attracted both praise and scorn.  
Wherever one stood on the emotional atmosphere surrounding the TRC, there was no 
debating it brought attention to South Africa’s TRC that no international truth 
commission before or after has been able to garner.  Tutu, for his part, was either 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Graybill, 27. 
24 Phelps, Teresa Godwin Phelps, Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and the Work of Truth 
Commissions, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 158.  Lyn Graybill writes how Tutu, 
responding to complaints of too zealous a religiosity in the hearings, promised to comport himself in a 
fashion more appropriate of a secular setting and substituting ‘moments of silence’ for prayers.  However, 
when soon confronted with a particularly harrowing victim’s story, he lost his resolve, saying: “No, this 
won’t work! We really cannot start like this.  People, close your eyes so that we can pray!” (Graybill, 28). 
25 Ibid., 27. 
 7
unaware of the criticism or chose to ignore it as he remained sanguine as well as 
pragmatic about his approach: 
 
Very few people objected to the heavy spiritual and indeed Christian 
emphasis of the commission.  When I was challenged on it by 
journalists I told them I was a religious leader and had been chosen as 
who I was.  I could not pretend I was someone else… It meant that 
theological and religious insights and perspectives would inform much 
of what we did and how we did it.26   
 
It is apparent, from this comment, that learning more about Tutu’s theological 
perspectives is fundamental to understanding the religious framework that informed 
the TRC’s work.  Tutu’s open religiosity struck some as inappropriate at best for the 
TRC’s proceedings and perhaps bizarre for others.  On the other hand, when reading 
the transcripts of the TRC hearings it becomes clear that an affinity for religious 
language and scriptural references was not driven by overzealous commissioners.  A 
religious idiom seemed to flow easily and voluntarily from many of those giving 
testimony.  Indeed, eighty-seven percent of South Africans indicated in a 2002/2003 
survey27 that they had some form of religious affiliation, while seventy percent of 
respondents to a 2001 survey claimed to attend a religious service at least once a 
month.28  Considering, then, the pervasive influence of religion in South Africa, it 
would seem that communicating in religious terms and values would be not only a 
suitable strategy but an effective one as well.   
 
 
Tutu’s Ubuntu Theology 
 
 Something other than Christian religious formulations permeated the TRC and is 
remarked upon by nearly all major analyses of the TRC; it emanates from the African 
tribal heritage and is commonly referred to as ubuntu.  While pre-Christian in origin, 
ubuntu is easily incorporated into Christian formulations.  Like many idiomatic words, 
Africans typically preface its interpretation with the caveat that it may not translate 
perfectly into English.  “Tutu is from the Xhosa people,” Michael Battle, a former Tutu 
aide, categorizes Tutu’s appropriation of ubuntu into his theology, “and his sense of 
ubuntu derives from the proverbial Xhosa expression ubuntu ungamntu ngabanye abantu 
which, translated roughly, means ‘each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed in 
relationship to others’ or a ‘person depends on other people to be a person’.”29  Tutu 
himself explains it this way: “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in 
yours.”30
                                                
26 Tutu, 82. 
27 South Africa Survey 2002/2003, (Johannesburg: South African Institute for Race Relations, 2003). 
28 Public Attitudes in Contemporary South Africa: Insights from an HRSC Survey, (Cape Town: HSRC 
Press, 2002), 89. 
29 Battle, Michael, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu, (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim 
Press, 1997), 39. 
30 Tutu, 31. 
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It was the incorporation of this ubuntu perspective into the TRC that may explain 
why many black South Africans were moved to publicly forgive those who oppressed or 
physically abused them.  It is within this worldview that many in the black community 
approached the commission’s work and thus equated the forgiveness of others, even 
oppressors, with the healing and restoration of society.  If the spirit of ubuntu already 
frames the thinking of the victims, it provides powerful leverage for a commission to 
promote its goal of reconciliation. 
Ubuntu, in theory at least, is a model not only for helping victims regain their 
humanity, but also for their oppressors to do the same.  The idea behind ubuntu is to 
restore the oppressor’s humanity by enabling the oppressed to see their oppressors as 
their peers under God.  The relationship of oppressor and oppressed, shattered by 
apartheid, is restored through the spirit of ubuntu.  When formulated into Tutu’s 
theology, ubuntu finds its genesis in the account of God’s creation, in which human 
identity is defined in the image of God.  Created by God, but becoming finite through sin, 
humans are nonetheless destined for reconciliation with God through God’s plan for 
redemption and salvation.  Accordingly, observes Battle, nothing less than becoming 
restored with the infinite God could ever hope to satisfy deep human longings.  “Secular 
prosperity, on the other hand,” he writes, “seduces us into judging others as if value were 
dependent on the production of goods.  It is from this materialist understanding of human 
identity that a society can only see racial difference as a threat and become possessed by 
apartheid.”31  According to Tutu, apartheid “makes no theological sense [because] it 
denies that human beings are created in the image of God.”32  This imago Dei theology 
for Tutu better describes as well as determines humanity because racial ideology 
inevitably leads to the use and abuse of power where the oppressor seeks to define a 
person.     
 
A Theology of Forgiveness 
 
An important component of ubuntu, as a facilitator of reconciliation, is the act of 
forgiving others for transgressions.  Forgiveness is also deeply constitutive of 
Christianity.  Indeed, writes Christian intellectual and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, 
forgiveness is the “crown of Christian ethics,” and is the “most difficult of moral 
achievements,” as its foundation is love of the other, while recognizing and 
acknowledging sin in the self.  In the Judaeo-Christian traditions, the aim of human 
forgiveness is reconciliation, the healing of broken relationships.33    
Principal among the Christian ideals characterizing the work of the TRC was its 
employment of what Rodney Petersen has called a Christian theology of forgiveness in 
which forgiveness is construed as the free gift of a loving God in which Jesus’ sacrifice 
upon the cross and His resurrection are both the personification of God’s grace and a 
model for human forgiveness.34  For Christians, a new law and a new prescription for 
                                                
31 Ibid., 5. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Amstutz, Mark, The Healing of Nations, (New York, Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 
46-47. 
34 Petersen, 3. I am employing this term, “theology of forgiveness,” most directly from Petersen, although it 
appears not to be original to him; it appears often in the scholarly, trade, and consumer presses, including a 
feature article entitled “The Theology of Forgiveness,” in Time magazine, Monday, Sept. 23, 1975. 
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forgiveness emerged through the narrative of the cross where Jesus’ death and 
resurrection is seen as embodying divine love and universal atonement for human sins.  
His life and final sacrifice created a new paradigm of unqualified grace, a model which 
Christians are urged to follow by offering unlimited and unconditional forgiveness to 
wrongdoers.35  In this paradigm, forgiveness is offered antecedent to, or in absence of, 
contrition or a secular form of justice 
This understanding of the relationship between God and humankind, as well as in 
human relations, represents, in the view of Hannah Arendt, the political theorist and 
intellectual, a radical and historical change.  She credits Jesus of Nazareth as being the 
“discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs.”  It was Jesus’ 
radical assertion of His power to forgive, even more than His miracles, says Arendt, that 
generated responses ranging from intrigue to cries of blasphemy.  Importantly, she 
observes, Jesus maintained that the power to forgive was not exclusive to God or even 
that this power derives from God, “…as though God, not men, would forgive through the 
medium of human beings.”36   
This Christian understanding of cross and resurrection narratives as the 
theological foundation for forgiveness is reflected in the TRC hearings and in the 
comments of Tutu, especially when he addresses the question of whether repentance must 
precede forgiveness: 
 
Does the victim depend on the culprit’s contrition and confession as the 
precondition for being able to forgive?  There is no question that, of 
course, such a confession is a very great help to the one who wants to 
forgive, but it is not absolutely indispensable.  Jesus did not wait until 
those who were nailing him to the cross had asked for forgiveness.  He 
was ready, as they drove in the nails, to pray to his Father to forgive them 
and he even provided an excuse for what they were doing.  If the victim 
could forgive only when the culprit confessed, then the victim would be 
locked into the culprit’s whim, locked into victimhood, whatever her own 
attitude or intention.  That would be palpably unjust.37
 
At the same time, in the understanding of Tutu and the TRC, this theological 
foundation of forgiveness did not exclude or dispense with repentance and restitution.  
Rather, forgiveness was posited as a force that both actuates and propels a continuum that 
leads to reconciliation; along that continuum, repentance and redress may occur.  
Retributive justice models may also produce a forbearance of violence and political 
stability.  Without forgiveness, however, reconciliation in the sense of a fully restored, 
harmonious relationship and society will not occur, thus the sense behind the title of 
Tutu’s memoir of the TRC, No Future Without Forgiveness.  For Tutu, truth-telling 
alone, unalloyed by forgiveness, lacks orientation.  By exposing the horror and injustice 
of past acts, truth-telling may just as easily fuel revenge or violence.  Alternatively, truth-
telling, when framed in a disposition of forgiveness and a restoration of personal 
                                                
35 Ibid., 21-23. 
36 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 
238-239.   
37 Tutu, 272. 
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relationships, provides the energy that feeds the process that leads to social and political 
reconciliation.  
 
Can Reconciliation Occur Where There is Imperfect Justice? 
 
While the TRC was grounded in secular purpose (achieving a peaceful transition 
of governments), its execution, as has been shown, was often shaded by theological 
perspective, language, and symbols.  The religious ambiance of the hearings combined 
with the amazing grace being demonstrated by Mandela, Tutu, and many of apartheid’s 
victims, seemed to reflect a stunning act of national salvation and reconciliation.  
However, this was not the case at all.  All was not, as the African hymn of unity 
proclaims, kumbaya.   
The TRC struggled mightily, not only with secular critics of its religious 
overtones but from within ecclesial circles as well.  “The popular view, in the United 
States at least,” writes Lyn Graybill, “of South Africa’s ‘Rainbow Nation’ miraculously 
embracing in a spirit of reconciliation is inaccurate.”  Whites remained largely aloof and 
unresponsive to the TRC, Graybill asserts, “surprised and grateful perhaps by the lack of 
bitterness and acts of vengeance toward them by blacks, but still unwilling to be 
transformed by the grace offered to them.”38  While the hope or expectation of Tutu and 
others from the faith community was that large numbers of perpetrators would seize upon 
the TRC as an opportunity to express remorse and victims would find it in their hearts to 
forgive, Graybill concludes, that expectation “has not universally occurred.”39   
 Another criticism directed against the TRC was that victims may have felt 
pressured to forgive their enemies, especially when highly public appeals were made to 
follow Christ’s model of self-renunciation and forgiveness of transgressors.  That led 
some observers to complain that the outward public displays of forgiveness were more 
attributable to Archbishop Tutu’s powerful and charismatic presence than a genuine 
response of forgiveness.   
In stark contrast to a sense of coaxed forgiveness in the victim hearings, Audrey 
Chapman writes that those presiding over the amnesty hearings did not share the same 
intensity in soliciting acknowledgements and contrition from perpetrators.  Indeed, the 
law’s requirements for amnesty did not include repentance.  This, Chapman observes, left 
many viewing the process as unbalanced and one-sided.40  To be sure, the amnesty 
hearings produced a number of acknowledgements of stark brutality accompanied by 
moving, tearful contrition and requests for forgiveness.  Others appearing before the 
amnesty board, however, acknowledged their deeds but did so under the protective 
umbrella of “following orders.”  Some (who knows how many) said one thing to the 
amnesty board in public, another in private.  Graybill recounts one Captain Jacques 
Hechter, a security policeman, expressing contrition for dozens of murders saying he had 
committed the acts “in the interest of the Republic of South Africa, my religion, and my 
Christian convictions.”41  Later, in private, Hechter reportedly said: 
                                                
38 Graybill, 22. 
39 Ibid., 53. 
40 Chapman, 289. 
41 Graybill, 52. 
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Ach, I’m not fuckin’ sorry for what I did.  Look—I fought for 
my country, I believed in what I did, and I did a good job.  
They were my enemy at the time.42
 
As indicated earlier, amnesty was not granted in all cases.  Indeed, less than 
twelve percent of those who made application were actually granted full amnesty.  On the 
other hand, if the amnesty applicant made a full disclosure, amnesty could be granted on 
the spot.  By contrast, victims requesting reparations or some form of rehabilitation had 
to make application and then wait for the reparations process to begin which, in fact, 
could not proceed until the Commission had closed and issued its final report in 1998.  
Even then, the cash-strapped South African government fell far short of the TRC’s 
recommendations.43  No wonder, then, that many looked upon the TRC as justice not 
only delayed but also either unfulfilled or unbalanced.   
These imperfections in the TRC process, however, were not the creation of the 
commissioners – they were merely working with an instrument that was the result of a 
political negotiation, the residue of bringing the white South African government to the 
point where it was willing to relinquish or share power.  Tutu, in his memoir of the TRC, 
recognizes the inherent limitations of the commission and in that context tries to look 
beyond these imperfections to a bigger picture, one centered on ubuntu: 
 
…the amnesty provision is an ad hoc arrangement meant for this 
specific purpose [restoring society following the long nightmare of 
apartheid].  This is not how justice is to be administered in South 
Africa forever.  It is for a limited and definite period and purpose.  
One might say that perhaps justice fails to be done only if the concept 
we entertain of justice is retributive justice, whose chief goal is to be 
punitive… We contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative 
justice, which was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence.  
Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment.  In the spirit 
of ubuntu, the central concern is the healing of breaches, the 
restoration of broken relationships44
 
Tutu, perhaps more than anyone else, recognized that as a result of the TRC’s 
structural flaws – which he concedes were negotiated by black as well as white 
politicians – “our freedom has been bought at a very great price.”45  Perhaps it was this 
recognition of its own imperfection that drove the commission to demonstrate a great 
deal of compassion and respect for the victims that had been so conspicuously denied 
them in the past.  
 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 While the TRC recommended victim reparation grants of US$3,830 a year for six years for those 
qualifying, the government, by 2000, had budgeted but a fifth of that total for a period of three years (Tutu, 
62). As of 2 June 2006, according to an article in the South African Mail & Guardian newspaper, most 
survivors called to give evidence during TRC hearings had received a single reparations payment of about 
US$4,000.  
44 Tutu, 54-55. 
45 Ibid. 
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The TRC: Reconciling the Religious and the Secular 
 
 While reconciling intra-church interpretations for forgiveness and reconciliation 
generated plenty of debate, perhaps even more challenging for the TRC was its attempt to 
reconcile religious and secular perspectives.  This hurdle was all the higher for some 
because of the presence of Christian language and symbols – prayers, hymns, lit candles.  
Use of religious frames and idioms within a secular commission was considered 
inappropriate by some observers.  Interestingly, that view was shared by some Christian 
clergy.  In one of the best assessments of the fruits of the TRC, the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) began a multidisciplinary study of the influence 
of religion on the TRC’s work shortly after the close of the TRC in 1998.  Published in 
2002, the core of the study features thirty interviews with leading religious figures, 
mostly Christian, working within South Africa.  The interviews themselves were 
reproduced in 2002 as Religion and Reconciliation in South Africa: Voices of Religious 
Leaders.  
 One of the more striking themes woven through these interviews with leading 
religious figures is that many were themselves uncomfortable or even critical of the 
TRC’s conflating national reconciliation with interpersonal forgiveness.  While there was 
agreement that forgiveness is especially characteristic of the Christian approach to 
personal reconciliation, there was concern that this formulation was not easily 
transferable to the secular arena where codified procedure and process dominate and 
where a more final judgment and reparation is fundamental.  Recognizing this, the 
majority of the interviewees also seemed to make their own distinction between 
forgiveness as an individual and religious option and criminal, social, or economic justice 
as the appropriate concern of secular society.   
 Reading through the interviews, one hears echoes of the proposition that true 
reconciliation must be accompanied by some tangible measure of justice, especially 
justice attained through a restructuring of disordered social and economic models.  This 
sentiment is reflected in the comments of Bishop Kevin Dowling, bishop of Rustenburg 
and Chair of the Justice and Peace Department of the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference.   
 
But in the end real reconciliation, I believe, in our country is only 
going to happen when people experience economic transformation, 
economic justice.  The radical redistribution of the resources of the 
country so that the degrading poverty and misery in which so many of 
our people lived and so many still live is going to change.46
 
 The bishop’s sentiments resonate with those of Fr. Sean O’Leary, acting director 
of the Pastoral Institute of the Catholic Bishops Conference, who believes that while 
forgiveness may apply to individual cases, it does not translate easily, if at all, to a 
broader social or national application.  O’Leary observes that secular society views the 
rule of law as correcting deviant behavior and does not have a formula for incorporating 
forgiveness or reconciliation.  The problem, then, O’Leary says is that ‘reconciliation’ is 
so susceptible to being misunderstood or interpreted differently.  The TRC, he says, 
                                                
46 Ibid., 175. 
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reflected these contrasting and often conflicting definitions: The first was to ‘forgive and 
forget’, as if you could wipe out the collective memory of a nation.  This approach would 
have negated and sabotaged the whole task of the Truth Commission, which was to 
acknowledge and record the past in such a way it would form the foundation for building 
a unified society.  The second was building bridges across the divisions in society, 
without seriously wanting to change the structures that maintained these divides.47
 For his part, Tutu and others on the TRC did not view their application of 
forgiveness as a matter of forgetting or eschewing justice: 
 
In forgiving, people are not being asked to forget.  On the contrary, it 
is important to remember, so that we should not let such atrocities 
happen again.  Forgiveness does not mean condoning what had been 
done.  It means taking what happened seriously and not minimizing it; 
drawing out the sting in the memory that threatens to poison our 
entire existence.  It involves trying to understand the perpetrators and 
so have empathy, to try to stand in their shoes and appreciate the sort 
of pressures and influences that might have conditioned them.48
 
Read closely, Tutu’s understanding reflects a more pragmatic notion of 
forgiveness, justice, and reconciliation than might be ordinarily credited.  It is not 
“forgiveness at all costs” nor is it “forgive-and-forget”; rather, it seeks, as the TRC did, to 
use the selfless act of forgiveness to create a new narrative that transforms the behavior 
of individuals who will, it is anticipated or hoped, shape broader social and cultural 
values and positively impact future conflicts.  This understanding is echoed by Miroslav 
Volf who does not separate forgiveness from the struggle for justice.  “Forgiveness,” 
writes Volf, “does not stand outside justice.”  While the will to “embrace” (Volf’s 
metaphor for forgiveness) is unconditional it also encompasses, he contends, the will to 
name a wrong as a wrong and it also includes the will to rectify the wrongs that have 
been done.  So forgiveness also entails an assigning of blame, and its acceptance is a 
reception of blame.  For Volf, forgiveness requires “attending to justice” but does not link 
itself to a final or adjudicated justice in the secular sense.  Indeed, Volf argues that 
waiting for a strict and final justice is not a fruitful approach for the very reason that no 
strict justice is possible.  “Within the overarching framework of strict justice, enough 
justice never gets done because more justice is always possible than in fact gets done.”  
For Volf a more constructive view of forgiveness is to frame it as a constituitive element, 
what might be termed a “kick-start” for a process or continuum that leads to 
reconciliation, a continuum that will include repentance on the part of offenders, justice 
for both victims and offenders, and restitution for victims.  In this continuum, however, 
forgiveness is both the starting point and the essential medium that propels this 
continuum.49   
 
 
 
                                                
47 Ibid., 202. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Volf, Miroslav, “Forgiveness, Reconciliation, & Justice,” in Helmick, Petersen, eds., 45-47. 
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Coming to Grips With Apartheid 
 
 An often cited criticism of the TRC’s work was its imbalance of racial 
participation with a relatively large number of black victims, prepared to bear witness and 
offer forgiveness, compared to a relatively small number of white perpetrators, prepared 
to confess, to offer repentance, and to request forgiveness.  Some of the interviewees 
concluded that the white community, for the greater part, continued to deny its moral 
complicity with the apartheid system and that it had benefited disproportionately from the 
TRC process.  This inability of the TRC to bring whites, in numbers, to ask for 
forgiveness was blamed on the absence of a strong, collective voice pleading for the 
white community to ask for forgiveness.  In other words, there was no ‘white Tutu.’  
Another reason cited for the lack of acceptance of the TRC’s work in the white 
community was that the proceedings were the object of negative reporting by the 
Afrikaans media and that the churches overall, especially the conservative Dutch 
Reformed Church, failed in bringing its members to accept the process as genuine and of 
value.  Ironically, it was the pathos of the hearings, which might have impressed others 
for its naked vulnerability and humanity, that struck the more stoic and constrained 
Afrikaners as staged and theatrical.50
 For some, the primary difficulty facing the TRC was congenital.  Fr. O’Leary 
seized on this as one of the central issues of the TRC.  “For me the tragedy of the TRC is 
that it was the child of political compromise.”51  Specifically, he targets the government’s 
interim constitution in which the ruling white-dominated Nationalist Party insisted on 
amnesty as a key provision in its negotiations with the black-dominated political groups: 
 
 It was only afterward, when people began to ask how it was possible 
to give amnesty and do nothing for those who are victims, that we got 
the compromise that became the TRC.  So I think the starting point 
for the TRC was not a good starting point.  One of the major defects 
of the amnesty process was that people do not have to say they are 
sorry.  You cannot force forgiveness, but you can force restitution, 
and I think we lost an avenue of real progress there.52
 
Another indictment of the work of the TRC is that one of its primary objectives – 
seeking “truth” – was compromised by its efforts to promote individual healing.  The TRC, 
argues Chapman, was “not a very effective mechanism to establish ‘historical truth.’”  The 
commission’s focus on personal experiences and morality, Chapman avers, diverted 
attention away from social reconstruction and community development.53  As these 
comments demonstrate, the TRC had a difficult, perhaps even an impossible mission and 
no lack of critics.  So, did anything positive result from injecting a religious component, 
especially religious values such as forgiveness and compassion, into the TRC hearings? 
 
 
                                                
50 Chapman, 291. 
51 Ibid., 204. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 273. 
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“The Truth Must Dazzle Gradually” 
 
 Central to the challenge facing both the TRC and South Africa was establishing a 
metric for reconciliation, especially when there are clear differences between secular and 
religious concepts of reconciliation.  One of the difficulties in judging the efficacy of a 
single ad hoc commission dealing with a mission as sweeping as national reconciliation, 
is that its influence is not often immediately salutary.  “Societies in transition are usually 
characterized by a cultural lag,” writes Gunnar Theissen of the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation.  “While new democratic institutions can be rapidly 
constructed, attitudes formed and entrenched under authoritarian rule generally survive 
well into the new dispensation.”  Theissen supports this premise by examining survey 
research conducted in post-war West Germany, demonstrating that public attitudes 
toward the Nazi regime and its victims changed slowly over several decades.54
 In the longer term, then, the real value of the TRC and its strategies for 
reconciliation may prove to have been germinal, a beginning rather than an ending.  A 
Dutch observer of the TRC’s proceedings saw this quality in the event as well when she 
reminded Tutu of a line from an Emily Dickinson poem: “The truth must dazzle 
gradually… or all the world be blind.”55   
 While substantial numbers of whites may not have been physically present at the 
victim hearings, it is impossible to assess how this televised and widely discussed event 
may have impacted the hearts and minds of listeners and viewers.  Chapman concludes, 
for instance, that the public hearings of the TRC had managed to communicate to a great 
extent the suffering endured by South Africa’s black population; the truth was out.  “Thus 
many of the whites, even those who had preferred not to know about the abuses inflicted 
by apartheid, could no longer deny the horrors of the apartheid system.”56  In other 
words, a significant contribution of the TRC was to establish a platform for alterity in 
South Africa, a fundamental ingredient for any democratic society.  Gripping stories and 
even a few tears shed are perhaps essential to breaking down that insulation and 
establishing the kind of empathy so important for society’s existence.   
 Of course, hearing the truth and acknowledging that truth are different matters as 
are knowing the truth and acting on the truth.  As Fr. O’ Leary observed, there are many 
definitions of reconciliation, but reconciliation of both individuals and societies must 
begin somewhere.  It may be little more than a mustard seed, but the truth, teamed with 
forgiveness is at least a seed.  Hopefully, it finds fertile soil.   
 
 
                                                
54 Theissen, Gunnar, “Object of Trust and Hatred: Public Attitudes Towards the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission”, in Truth and Reconciliation: Has the TRC Delivered?, eds. Chapman, Audrey and Van Der 
Merwe, Hugo, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, to be published in 2007).  Theissen writes: 
“The Nuremburg Trials and the Allied de-nazification campaign were unpopular during the 1950s, but 
public opinion shifted in the following decades.  The Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt 1963-65 for example 
helped to destroy the startling suppression of the holocaust in German public memory after 1945.  Today, 
50 years after the end of World War II public awareness about the Nazi atrocities has intensified, not 
decreased.” 
55 TRC Report, Vol, 1, Ch. 1, in Foreword by Chairperson, 4.  The Dickinson poem alluded to is entitled, 
“Tell all the Truth but tell it slant.” 
56 Chapman, 290. 
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Forgiveness and the Process of Reconciliation 
  
 There is some empirical support for the assertion that the trajectory of South 
Africa’s reconciliation process is positive.  In a 2005/2006 survey conducted by the 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the willingness of black South Africans to 
forgive those under whom they suffered psychological and, in some cases physical 
trauma, continues in a positive track.  Some 72.1% of black South African respondents 
concurred with the statement that they are “trying” to forgive the human agents and 
benefactors of apartheid.  This is 11% higher than a similar survey four years earlier.57   
In an earlier survey, in 2000, also conducted by IJR and seen here as Exhibit 1, 
forgiveness was ranked by South Africans as the most important component in achieving 
national reconciliation.58
 
Exhibit 1.  What is Necessary for Reconciliation? 
 
 All South 
Africans 
% 
Black  
% 
White  
% 
Coloured 
% 
National reconciliation requires South 
Africans understand one another better 
 
75 
 
77 
 
63 
 
78 
National reconciliation requires material 
compensation for apartheid victims 
 
60 
 
70 
 
20 
 
48 
National reconciliation requires people to 
forgive one another 
 
78 
 
81 
 
64 
 
83 
National reconciliation requires 
forgetting the past 
 
65 
 
66 
 
64 
 
70 
National reconciliation requires the 
healing of memories 
 
71 
 
73 
 
56 
 
75 
National reconciliation requires amnesty 
as provided by the TRC 
 
62 
 
69 
 
29 
 
54 
 
Source: Pilot Reconciliation Survey, 2000.  Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 
accessed online at http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/publ/surveys
 
 
 
The TRC at the Nexus of Forgiveness, Justice, and Reconciliation 
 
 This examination of the TRC has revealed that semantics and perspective played 
an important and underlying role in the conflicting assessments of the TRC.  The three 
key terms – forgiveness, justice, and reconciliation – as well as their inter-relationships 
are viewed differently not only between secular and religious agents but within each of 
these two poles as well.  As has been suggested, the best metric for reconciliation may 
                                                
57 Sixth Round Report, The SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 
November 2006, 48. 
58 Pilot Reconciliation Survey 2000, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 3. 
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not be in viewing it as something achievable in a utopian and final form but as a process, 
a movement toward something new and better but which, in the meantime, presents us a 
formula for living within a world of strife.59
 While truth-telling was the common skein running through the fabric of the TRC, 
what makes the South African TRC unique among truth commissions was its partnering 
of forgiveness with truth-telling.  In history, Hannah Arendt sees forgiveness exerting a 
unique source of power, the kind of power that not only restores but also creates anew.  
Forgiveness, according to Arendt, is our only release from what has been done in the 
past.  
  
Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely 
re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act 
which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both 
the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.  The freedom 
contained in Jesus’ teachings of forgiveness is the freedom from 
vengeance, which encloses both doer and sufferer in the relentless 
automatism of the action process, which by itself need never come to 
an end.60
 
 Christians talk about Jesus “shattering expectations,” refusing to comport to what 
humans expected of a Messiah.  Forgiving, as Arendt contends, is also an unexpected, 
unconditioned act that enables the creation of something new; it breaks the cycle of 
action and reaction.  In coming to grips with the wounds of apartheid in South Africa, it 
is important that its citizens first be released from the corrosive cycle of violence and 
vengeance to produce a new creation, perhaps one where Tutu’s ubuntu vision of mutual 
recognition and reconciliation is a core principle.  The citizens, both the forgiving victims 
and the repentant perpetrators that appeared in the TRC hearings, shattered the concepts 
of how people react to oppression and violence.   
 The TRC, in effect, transformed itself into a model or template for what it thought 
was required of South Africans in search of reconciliation, both interpersonal and social 
and political reconciliation.  Truth-telling was the platform but the meaning of the 
victims’ narrative was contextualized by forgiveness which, in turn, would motivate the 
continuing search for justice and reconciliation.  It is this understanding of the qualities 
and role of forgiveness that underpins this thesis that truth commissions in the future 
should seek a place within its activities for a formulation of forgiveness.  At the same 
time, any formulation of forgiveness should be clear that forgiveness is not a one-time act 
of absolution but represents a process which aims at a change of heart and change of 
behavior that we call reconciliation.  By embodying forgiveness, South Africa’s TRC 
became both a medium and model for what reconciliation can look like.   
 In South Africa, the religious framing of the TRC proved that religious voices 
and values can play a salutary role in practical politics as well as in shaping the debate 
and future of the nation.  That role, however, appears to offer the most value when its 
ideals and language are viewed as forces that actuate and propel the motivation to 
change, not incorporated into law or formulated as a final justice.  Reconciliation in 
                                                
59 Petersen, 45 
60 Arendt, 241. 
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South Africa will be the outcome of a process whose beginning point and medium is 
forgiveness.  Tutu told his nation there was no future without forgiveness.  Many South 
Africans today, both black and white, recognize the power of forgiveness, a power 
whose role in conflict resolution, Tutu believes, is often underestimated:   
 
We must break the spiral of reprisal and counter-reprisal… I said to them 
in Kigali “unless you move beyond justice in the form of a tribunal, there 
is no hope for Rwanda.”  Confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation in 
the lives of nations are not just airy-fairy religious and spiritual things, 
nebulous and unrealistic.  They are the stuff of practical politics.61
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